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Abstract 
 
EU governments have engaged in a coordinated effort to combat 
social exclusion. This is puzzling for empirical and theoretical 
reasons. The paper argues that integration of social inclusion 
policies can be explained by the political economy of domestic 
reform, driven by structural change in EU welfare states, facilitated 
by the new Open Method of Coordination. This explanation is 
contrasted with the view that European integration is motivated by 
EU bureaucrats’ interest in expanding their competencies and 
national administrations’ attempt to instrumentalise the EU for 
protection of their clientele.   
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1.   Introduction 
Until the late 1990s, Social Europe was hardly visible compared to 
the internal market and monetary union. Economic integration, it 
was argued, puts pressure on national welfare systems but does little 
to sustain and strengthen them (Scharpf 1997).  Most of what was 
discernible as social policy integration had been ‘left to courts and 
markets’ to develop, i.e. evolved as a by-product of market making 
in the legal and the economic system (Leibfried and Pierson 2000).   
At the turn of the century, however, this evolution seems to 
have prepared the ground for more active social policy integration 
(Falkner 2000).  The Lisbon Summit, in particular, was a watershed. 
Governments decided to implement the open method of 
coordination on social inclusion (Ferrera, Hemmerijck and Rhodes 
2000; Mosher 2000).
1  While there is a legitimate debate on how 
much progress this method entails for Social Europe, a consensus 
has emerged that it makes a difference to social policy in the EU 
and its member states (de la Porte, Pochet and Room 2001; 
Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Schelkle 2004).   
Why have EU governments been willing to communiterise in 
social policy matters at all and, in particular, why have they been 
willing to do so with respect to the safety nets of last resort?  I take 
the example of social inclusion because it is, from a political 
economy point of view, a rather unlikely candidate for policy 
integration. Social assistance is neither required for the completion 
of the single market nor relevant in fiscal terms. Other conventional 
reasons for policy integration, such as economies of scale in public 
goods provision, are not particularly convincing either. But an 
explanation based on the political economy of reform (PER) in EU 
member states can shed light on this improbable instance of policy 
integration (e.g. Falkner 2000: 280; Mosher 2000: 7).  
The PER explanation has typically been used to counter the 
‘globalisation hypothesis’ according to which it is external 
competitive pressure which forces governments to welfare state 
reforms. This can either lead to downsizing for competitiveness 
reasons or to expansion in order to protect losers and buy off their 
opposition. Iversen and Cusack (2000) and the contributions in 
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Pierson (2001a) in contrast argue that it is domestic structural 
changes, such as demographics, deindustrialisation and fiscal crisis, 
that create adjustment pressure. The different regimes respond to 
these pressures gradually and reluctantly which is testimony to the 
lasting political popularity and economic salience of the welfare 
state.  
From this perspective, the EU seems to be adding above all to 
already existing fiscal pressures (Pierson 2001c). It is not obvious, 
however, why member states would suddenly agree on new forms 
of integration in the social policy area. Given its finding of 
considerable resilience of the welfare state, it apparently does not 
refute the Leviathan hypothesis (LH) forwarded by public choice 
theorists. To them, integration of social assistance policies is yet 
another instance of member state governments granting EU 
bureaucrats a free grabbing hand to protect their domestic 
constituencies, thereby expanding the Commission’s portfolios.
2 It 
thus reflects the world view of mainstream political economy as 
practised by economists where good politics is bad economics, and 
vice versa. 
These alternative hypotheses have been chosen because their 
comparison can tell us, first, how legitimate the expansion of the 
EU into the social policy arena is likely to be; secondly, what is 
driving reforms in mature welfare states; and, lastly, how domestic 
reform agendas and this breakthrough in EU social policy 
integration is linked. Moreover, it can shed light on the explanatory 
power of different theories of European political economy. 
The argument is developed in three steps: I discuss, first, why 
the EU’s coordinated combat of social exclusion poses a theoretical 
puzzle and what the two competing explanations I discuss here have 
to say about it.  I look, secondly, at the evidence of recent welfare 
state reforms that may broadly refute or confirm basic tenets of the 
two explanations. I argue thirdly that the peculiar form of positive 
integration, the open method of coordination (OMC), is key to 
refute the alternative LH. The last section concludes with some 
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remarks on how this paper contributes to the literature on the 
political economy of reform.  
2.   Why social policy integration is puzzling 
The Lisbon Council spelled out the basic elements of OMC 
(Council 2000, point 37):  
•  Guidelines for social policy are combined with specific 
timetables for achieving short, medium and long term goals.  
•  The European guidelines are translated into national and 
regional policies by setting specific targets and measures. 
•  Quantitative and qualitative indicators, while tailored to the 
needs of different member states and sectors, make policies 
comparable. 
•  Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review is organised as 
a mutual learning process based on benchmarking. 
•  The Commission is in charge to distill best practices on 
managing change out of these repeated exercises.  
The new instrument integrates, but does not harmonise, social 
inclusion policies. This section first outlines why it is puzzling that 
governments have agreed on this new form of EU governance with 
respect to social inclusion, then I sketch alternative approaches to 
solve the puzzle.  
2.1  The twofold puzzle 
The EU member states’ coordination of social assistance policies is 
puzzling for empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, 
integration of inclusion policies progressed faster and went further 
than other areas of social policy. In less than a decade, the EU 
moved from the 1992 directive on the definition of sufficient 
resources in social assistance systems (Council 1992a) to the OMC 
on social inclusion (Commission 2001).  This is remarkable if 
compared to the rather low speed of integration processes in the EU 
even with respect to social policies that are arguably more relevant 195   European Political Economy Review 
to the internal market. E.g., Falkner (2000: 289-290) mentions cases 
in which the creation of a European labour market would require to 
amend labour laws on individual renumeration and collective 
representation. Perhaps this simply means that social inclusion is 
just another example for the union coming closer at a notoriously 
uneven, capricious speed. But the implementation of an OMC on 
inclusion policies is also remarkable if compared with the fate of 
initiatives launched around the same time:  
•  There was another directive in 1992 aiming at a convergence of 
objectives and policies on social protection more generally 
(Council 1992b). Precious little came out of it, presumably 
because the differences in social protection regimes are hard to 
reconcile (de la Porte, Pochet and Room 2001: 296-297). Yet, 
this could also be said of means-tested assistance which plays a 
very different role in different welfare regimes. 
•  At the Lisbon Summit in March 2000, it was also agreed that 
the OMC should be applied to pensions. But activity in this 
policy area has picked up only recently, although the Economic 
Policy Committee and the European Central Bank have urged 
governments to reform their pension systems to make them 
fiscally sustainable for some time (Pakaslathi and Pochet 2003: 
116-117). A first joint report that contained no common 
indicators was accepted by the Spring Council in 2003. 
•  Attempts to coordinate health care policies are in their infancy 
although the compatibility of systems would definitely 
contribute to mobility of employees. And, like pension reforms, 
health care reforms have a far greater impact on public finances 
than social assistance and thus are arguably a more immediate 
‘matter of common concern’. 
In other words, these other initiatives would have a rationale in 
the theory of fiscal federalism while coordination – in contrast to 
central financing - of social assistance policies does not (Oates 
1999; Schelkle 2000). 
Moreover, the Open Method brought about positive integration. 
For instance, governments have agreed on a set of common 
indicators to benchmark their systems. They have agreed on 
common goals, among which the emphasis on ‘activation’, basically 
re-integration into the labour market, is the most noticeable and Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    196 
contentious (Begg et al 2001: 6, 20-22). The Commission claims 
that the first joint report “gives a concrete reality to the open 
method of coordination on Social Inclusion” (Commission 2001: 4). 
It is so far the only policy document on poverty ever presented by 
the Commission.  
This is irritating for a well-known political economy theorem 
according to which there is an asymmetry in favour of negative 
integration (Scharpf 1999: 50-83). It states that the ‘zeitgeist’ of 
supply-side interventionism and organised business interests will 
favour EU measures that serve to remove barriers to the mobility of 
factors of production and commodities in order to ‘make markets’.
3  
In contrast, integration measures to protect consumers and labour, 
primarily to correct markets, are less likely to materialise. 
Typically, the interests served by positive integration are less vocal 
and, above all, the sacrifices in terms of national sovereignty more 
severe.  Since governments are usually more inclined to 
acknowledge differences than to give up parts of the national 
regulatory framework, positive integration is difficult to achieve.  
The coordinated combat against poverty and social exclusion 
has only an indirect link to the mobility of labour. The freedom of 
movement in the EU is materially guaranteed for employed workers 
only, not for those of working age receiving social assistance. Only 
insofar inclusion measures improve the employability of jobseekers 
do they help to fulfil a precondition for labour mobility. But they 
are not meant to increase the spatial mobility of transfer recipients, 
thus contributing to the integration of European labour markets. 
Therefore, the OMC can be interpreted as an attempt ‘to rebalance 
[...] the structural asymmetry between negative and positive 
integration’ (Ferrera, Hemmerijck and Rhodes 2000: 65).  Yet this 
rebalancing act is theoretically puzzling given that the socially 
excluded do not dispose of effective lobbies driven by economic 
interests which contradicts a central assumption of the asymmetry 
theorem. 
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2.2  Possible solutions to the puzzle 
This subsection outlines two attempts at solving the puzzle why this 
leap in social policy coordination has occurred and why with 
respect to an area that is not of major concern to the median voter 
and fiscally rather marginal. The theoretical sketch serves, first, to 
highlight the specifics of a PER explanation and, second, to obtain a 
guide to the wealth of evidence that is notoriously difficult to 
interpret. 
In my view, a PER explanation sees the open method as a 
means to deal with opposition to the domestic reform agenda and 
contains imminent systems competition at the same time. There is, 
first of all, a domestic reform agenda which may be driven by 
deindustrialisation or the weakening of the family as a safety net. 
Social exclusion problems resulting from these developments are 
specific to the different ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’ (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996; Begg et al 2001: 17-20). But the 
worlds have in common that they are difficult to change, due to the 
inertia of institutions and the resilience of entrenched interests they 
helped to create.  Thus, internal reform pressures are not simply 
‘overwhelming’, politicians have to make them appear irresistible.
4  
Moreover, even if they succeed in convincing the pivotal voter of 
the need for reform, policymakers who seek reelection have to think 
about excuses in case of failure. This may entail shifting blame to a 
scapegoat like ‘globalisation’ or ‘Brussels’ but it may also mean 
seeking acceptance for learning experiences in unkown territory. In 
short, an analysis in line with the PER involves three steps:  
1.  Its point of departure are domestic reform pressures, a political 
‘demand’ for reform, that this approach claims to be the prime 
mover based on thorough empirical studies (Pierson 2000a; 
Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Iversen and Cusack 2000).  
2.  It is a political economy approach in that it goes on to explore 
the institutional obstacles and political opposition to reforms, 
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the need for which is typically taken for granted. Given the 
emphasis on resilience despite considerable pressures for 
adjustment, this approach expects to find restructuring as a 
result of welfare state reforms rather than outright expansion or 
retrenchment (Pierson 2000c). 
3.  Against this background the approach looks at the political 
techniques, the specifics of the ‘supply side’, which make 
politicians look active, i.e. tackling the problems which they 
promised to fix while avoiding the blame for reform failures.  
Notably, the first proposition, namely domestic pressures urge 
governments to attempt reform, implies through the third 
proposition that social policy integration has to be seen as an 
instrument to push through unpopular domestic reforms rather than 
as a functionalist outcome of EU market integration. This 
instrumental view of integration is the main argument that qualifies 
the asymmetry theorem stating a discrepancy between a functional 
requirement and the reality of integration. 
The PER leads us to observe the following: 
•  Source of reform pressures: Governments have tried to reform 
social assistence policies because their regime-specific social 
exclusion or poverty problems were (perceived as) becoming 
worse and thus politically embarassing. 
•  EU involvement: Despite these internal pressures, reforms in 
this marginal policy area do not get easily off the ground against 
the opposition of professionalised and respectable organised 
interests like the church and other charities; only after 
governments tried unsuccessfully were they ready to give the 
EU a role. The EU could claim that it has to play a legitimate 
role given the systems competition that is likely to result from 
integration. 
  
•  Impact of coordinated reforms: Some qualitative restructuring 
of welfare states should be discernible even if quantitative or 
aggregate indicators do not show much change; a social policy 
area like social assistance which is not popular with the middle-
class median voter is likely to become more stringent as regards 
eligibility for and generosity of transfers. 199   European Political Economy Review 
To contrast this approach with the LH of policymaking: This 
public choice approach suggests that integration of social assistance 
policies has to be seen as yet another expression of the inherent 
tendency of the state in general, the EU in particular, to expand.  It 
has three defining elements (Brennan and Buchanan 1980: ch.2; 
Sinn 1992: 178-180):  
1.  Government is ‘despotic’ in the sense that an administration in 
office cannot be effectively constrained by the electorate. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980: 17-24) explicitly dismiss the 
median voter theorem or more generally an effective impact of 
electoral demand on ongoing political processes. The political 
process and the provision of public goods are thus driven by the 
‘supply side’. Obviously, the ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU can 
be seen as a variant of this despotism.  Rieger (2001), for 
instance, argues that the democratic deficit is the very core of 
the EU and makes the EU set-up effectively a unitary, not a 
multi-level governance structure.  Non-democratic mechanisms 
may work, however, like households’ voting with their feet or 
capital flight. Both exert their influence through an immediate 
impact on tax revenue. 
2.  The political economy element here means that government is 
non-benevolent.  The goals of self-interested policymakers 
cannot be condensed into a social welfare function.  They boil 
down to revenue maximisation in excess of what is necessary to 
produce the public goods provided.  Waste, distortionary 
taxation and excessive regulatory competencies are what this 
view would expect as the normal outcome of government 
activity.  
3.  Government acts analogously to the manager of a club.  Most 
public goods that the EU member states or the EU itself produce 
are club goods: they rival in their use since subsidised access 
leads to ‘overcrowding’ of universities or queueing at the 
National Health Service; moreover, consumption can be 
effectively excluded by stipulating access on national or EU 
citizenship.  This gives national governments or the EU the 
opportunity to distribute benefits exclusively to some members 
of the club which incidentally may be the policymakers 
themselves. Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    200 
This view finds basic assumptions of the asymmetry hypothesis 
questionable.  In particular, it is unfathomable that governments 
engage in negative integration to make markets since unfettered 
market forces contain their effectiveness of intervention.  Positive 
integration is likely if it helps the club managers to attract additional 
resources and to protect members of their club (e.g. Berthold and 
Neumann 2002: 23-25).  Empirically, the three elements of the LH 
make an observer to expect the following:  
•  Source of reform pressures: There should be a secular rise in 
aggregate social expenditure, a trend that is only broken if 
countries experience an exodus of the mobile factor capital.
5  
Despotic governments if constrained to finance the expenditures 
necessary for reelection takes recourse to deficit financing until 
that is again resented by firms and households. Thus, EU market 
integration or globalisation more generally should have been the 
force that disciplined governments, if at all, because mobile 
capital can locate more easily elsewhere or because taxpayers 
become more aware of alternatives and respond accordingly. 
•  EU involvement: We should observe a secular expansion of EU 
involvement in the social policy field that cannot be justified on 
normative grounds. Since the EU does not raise revenue itself, 
its non-benevolent character in this area must show up in 
portfolio maximisation with the methods of intervention 
providing ample opportunity for discretion. 
•  Impact of coordinated reforms: The LH entails a distinct 
proposition on how governments or the EU provide poverty 
relief (Brennan and Buchanan 1980: 28). The non-benevolent 
character of public administrations as well as the club good 
features of their output typically make them reluctant to give 
cash transfers to the poor. But they are ready to expand services 
or labour intensive forms of poverty relief since this provides 
additional jobs in the bureaucracy. Thus, the coordinated 
combat of social exclusion should favour reforms that render 
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social assistance less generous as regards cash transfers while 
expenditure on personnel may even increase.  
This contrast of two political economy approaches, besides 
providing general solutions to the puzzle stated earlier, gives us 
distinct propositions about the evidence to be explored. 
3.   What the evidence tells us  
The following review is selective in that it looks only at the 
evidence that is contested between the two explanations just 
outlined.  
3.1  Sources of reform pressures  
The prime mover of reform efforts is structural change in the 
domestic economy according to PER, the external pressure of 
capital flight according to LH. I will first look at the record of 
reform in EU welfare states. Then I briefly look at a possible 
correlation between capital flows and the growth of social 
expenditure. The final piece of evidence stems from a summary of 
the evidence on domestic versus external pressures for welfare state 
reform. 
Boeri (2001) explores the intensity and direction of reforms in 
the area of employment protection legislation, nonemployment 
benefits (including social assistance) and pensions from 1986-1997. 
This is a time period before an OMC on social inclusion was 
seriously considered. Two results are outstanding. First, the 14 
countries (excluding Luxembourg) have undertaken 198 reforms in 
a decade, i.e. more than one reform per year and country. This 
activism hardly justifies the stereotypical diagnosis of 
‘Eurosclerosis’ that haunts EU member states ever since the early 
1980s.  Second, most countries have undertaken reforms that are 
fairly balanced as regards a restrictive and an expanding stance. 
Only with respect to nonemployment benefits did most countries try 
to make the systems less generous.  
Ditch and Oldfield (1999), updating the first comprehensive 
survey of social assistance systems in the OECD by Eardley et al 
(1996), support this latter finding for the narrower category of Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    202 
social assistance. Most countries were ‘consolidators’, i.e. 
undertook marginal reforms that made existing eligibility criteria 
like work tests more stringent (e.g. France and Germany) or 
lowered benefit levels (e.g. Finland and Sweden) without changing 
the system. Of all EU countries, only Portugal sought to extend the 
provision of social assistance, starting from a very low base, in 
1993. Until the late 1990s, the UK was the sole ‘innovator’ in the 
EU, introducing a Family Credit, a New Deal for Lone Parents and 
a Jobseeker’s Allowance which together amounted to a coherent 
‘welfare to work’ package. 
The evidence supports the first step in the PER explanation, 
namely that governments have undertaken domestic reforms even 
prior to formal EU involvement. But was it, as the LH proposes, 
perfect capital mobility which forced them to reform before they 
then decided to redraw the boundaries of the club? The balanced 
nature of reforms, documented above, is not reassuring for the LH. 
This was at a time when the internal market programme raised 
capital mobility. Chart 1 explores this correlation which allows for 
both directions of causation. To get a sense of direction, two 
different time periods have been chosen, namely the real growth 
rate of public social expenditure from 1980 to 1998 which is plotted 
against the net capital outflow between 1986 and 1998. Each point 
represents an EU member state.
6 The LH would suggest that capital 
is driven out by rising expenditures which subsequently induces 
governments to form a policy ‘cartel’, i.e. to integrate social 
policies.  
The admittedly rough sketch indicates close to no relationship 
between the rise in social expenditure (in constant 1995 prices, at 
purchasing power parity exchange rates to the US-$) and the net 
capital outflow (measured in US-$) over a longer time period. The 
visual impression of a positive correlation is driven by the outlier 
Germany in the upper right hand corner which has high capital 
outflows and high growth of social expenditure. Without it, a 
regression line would basically be horizontal indicating no 
statistically significant relationship. 
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Chart 1:   Net capital outflows and real growth in public social 
expenditure for 11 EU countries 
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The LH also expects that openness will lead to smaller welfare 
states because that is what brings capital and jobs, thus raising the 
re-election chances of politicians (Sinn 1992: 183). In another 
context, Iversen and Cusack (2000), Iversen (2001) and Pierson 
(2001b) directly explore the evidence for internal structural changes 
against evidence for ‘globalisation’ as the prime mover. The 
‘globalisation’ hypothesis they are arguing against claims that open 
welfare states will have to be bigger in order to sustain democratic 
support for world market integration.
7 Still, some of the evidence 
they provide in favour of structural change also speaks to the public 
choice variant of the globalisation hypothesis: 
•  Structural change accounts for the diversity of social exclusion 
problems countries face. The shift to service sector employment 
means a rise in marginal, low-paid jobs. The transformation of 
household structures like the rise in family break-up, out-of-
wedlock births, and single parent households means that the 
family as a pillar of social welfare has been weakened and this 
means different things in different welfare regimes (Esping-
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Andersen 1999). This diversity itself defies the notion that it is 
one factor like ‘globalisation’ or, more specifically, ‘mobile 
capital’ that can explain the picking up of reform activities 
(Pierson 2001b: 100). 
•  More rigorous quantitative assessment indicates that 
deindustrialisation, i.e. the sectoral shift of employment to the 
service sector away from manufacturing and agriculture, is 
positively correlated with a rise in welfare spending (Iversen 
2001: 54-55). In particular, ‘capital openness’ is not statistically 
significant as a determinant of welfare spending in the 
regression analysis of Iversen and Cusack (2000: 321-322). 
Moreover, there is evidence for the importance of partisan 
politics and labour market risks that explain welfare state 
restructuring. All this is hard to reconcile with the LH because it 
means that electoral demand factors have an impact on reform 
processes.  
3.2  EU involvement  
If there has been reform, the PER suggests that ‘demand factors’, 
i.e. electoral representation and interest intermediation, have 
influenced this process. Consequently, the EU’s involvement now 
must be broadly popular for the very reason that the welfare state is 
broadly popular even if not every involvement or any policy, 
respectively.  The LH, in contrast, presupposes that EU involvement 
caters to a certain clientele for which the median voter has to bear 
the costs.  Social policy competencies of the EU should therefore be 
unpopular. 
The Eurobarometer of Spring 2003 reports responses to the 
question whether the 1000 respondents of each country “think that 
the decisions should be made by the [own] government, or made 
jointly with the European Union” with respect to 27 policy areas. 
Answers are reported in percentages where N means “decisions 
should be taken Nationally”; S “decisions should be Shared” and U 
that respondents were “Uncertain” (N+S+U=100). Each cell of table 
1 – which is an update of Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2001) 
- has been calculated by taking the difference between those in 
favour of shared responsibilities (S – N) and weighting it with the 205   European Political Economy Review 
share of certain respondents (multiply with [1-U/100]). Thus, the 
weight is lower the more uncertain respondents are (percentages are 
rounded). The larger the number in each cell, the stronger the 
preference in favour of ‘shared’ responsibilities in the respective 
country. The maximum theoretical entry is 100 indicating a 
unanimous preference for ‘shared’, the minimum is -100 indicating 
unanimity in favour of ‘national’.  
Table 1:   Desired allocation of policy responsibilities
a according 
to Eurobarometer (2003) 
  Social exclusion/ 
poverty   
Unemployment Health  and 
social welfare 
Austria  17 2  -48 
Belgium  21 -2  -29 
Denmark  14 -25  -67 
Finland  3 -40  -80 
France   34 14  -47 
Germany  29 -8  -39 
Greece  43 37  -19 
Ireland  35 10  -20 
Italy  49 29  -9 
Luxembourg  31 -22  -37 
Netherlands  17 -20  -33 
Portugal  28 18  -1 
Spain  45 14  -9 
Sweden  5 -23  -82 
United Kingdom  14 -28  -35 
EU-15  32 1  -30 
 
a  % >0: balance in favour of shared responsibility EU and national gov.t 
Source:  Eurobarometer (March 2003, tables 7.8); own calculations. 
 
The table shows the results for just three social policy areas. 
The difference as regards the popularity of EU involvement is 
striking: Respondents are quite sympathetic to shared Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    206 
responsibilities in social inclusion, have very different views as 
regards unemployment and definitely do not want EU 
responsibilities in health and social welfare. But is also important to 
notice the heterogeneity of preferences across countries: the 
minimum (3 in Finland) and the maximum (49 in Italy) in favour of 
shared responsibility for social inclusion policies are quite far apart. 
This suggests that a highly centralised and harmonised EU approach 
to this policy domain would not be popular. This result is a blow to 
the LH view of governments’ despotism. The EU is most active in a 
social policy area that is supported by a majority of national 
electorates.  
3.3  Possible impact 
So far, the review of the evidence suggests that the source of 
reforms was domestic changes rather than external competition. 
That governments responded quite vividly to these pressures is in 
line with the PER, difficult to explain for the LH. Yet, we have only 
assessed the qualitative direction of reforms. LH proponents could 
still claim that governments use qualitative changes only to expand 
social expenditures quantitatively (e.g. Fehn 2001: 26; Lindbeck 
1999: 83). To take the favourite case of public choice theorists, 
Sweden: between 1993 and ’98, social assistance benefit levels per 
capita were lowered, yet aggregate expenditure on social assistance 
doubled (Ditch and Oldfield 1999: 68). Therefore even restrictive 
reforms may increase spending, along with the expansionary ones, 
and this would be in line with what the LH expects if pressures 
from capital markets are ineffective. Less comfortable for the LH is 
that the Swedish pattern, a kind of reverse Laffer effect (lower 
transfer rate leads to higher overall expenditure), was also observed 
in the UK under the Thatcher administration. In contrast, the PER 
predicts that domestic reforms show up in a discernible shift in the 
composition of welfare expenditure while the effect on the level of 
spending could go either way or simply level off. Therefore, let us 
look at the evidence on the level and then on the composition of 
social expenditure.  207   European Political Economy Review 
What we observe is a levelling off of welfare spending.The 
range of spending levels has slightly sshifted upwards, from below 
15 percent of GDP (Portugal) and 30 percent (Sweden) to slightly 
above almost 16 percent (Ireland) and almost 31 percent (Sweden). 
We also observe little convergence of spending levels (with the 
exception of Portugal). This levelling off across all countries is hard 
to reconcile with the LH which proposes that welfare spending 
stops rising only after the leaner welfare states caught up and 
reached the ‘growth to limits’ as signalled, for instance, by massive 
capital flight or tax protests.  
 
Chart 2: Changes in the level of social expenditure, 1986 – 1998 
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But is restructuring discernible as the PER leads one to expect? The 
following chart shows the shares of major expenditure components Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    208 
in 1998, the following table then documents the changes compared 
to 1986. I have lumped twelve categories of the OECD social 
expenditure database into four, namely (i) old age cash benefits, (ii) 
health and sickness benefits, (iii) family benefits (cash, services and 
for survivors) and (iv) spending on the combat of ‘social exclusion’. 
The latter comprises all expenditure on unemployment and active 
labour market programmes, disability cash benefits and services 
(including services for the elderly), on housing benefits and for 
‘other contingencies’, the latter including ‘low income’, i.e. social 
assistance in a narrow sense.  
Chart 3: Structure of public social welfare spending (% of GDP), 
1998 
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This consolidation of the OECD categories makes spending on 
social inclusion the third largest category (after old age cash and 
health/sickness) in most member states. In Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden this item is then the largest while in 
Austria it is the smallest.- ‘Occupational disease’ has been left out 
which is a tiny share of public expenditure in all countries. 
The changes if compared to 1986 have not been fundamental. 
As table 2 shows, spending on old age cash and health plus sickness 
benefits has gone up in a majority of countries. The balance is 
roughly even for expenditures on family benefits and social 
inclusion. Arrows in parentheses indicate minor changes of around 
0.5 percent of GDP, a blank cell no change. This underlines what 
has been said in section 3.1, namely that reforms have been fairly 
balanced. 
Table 2:   Direction of spending in four social policy areas, 1986 
compared to 1998  
  AU  BE DK  FIN  FR GE GR  IRL  IT LU  NE  PO  SP SW  UK 
OAC  (Ò)  Ò  Ò  (Ò)  Ò  Ò  Ò  Ô  Ò  Ò  (Ô)  Ò  Ò    Ò 
SBH  (Ò)    Ô  Ô  Ò  Ò  (Ò)  Ô  Ò  (Ò)  Ô  Ò  Ò  Ô  (Ò) 
FB    Ô  Ò  Ò  (Ô)  Ò  Ò   ( Ò)  Ô  Ô  (Ò)  Ô  Ò  (Ô) 
SI  Ò  Ô  Ò  Ò    Ò  Ò  Ô    Ô  Ô   ( Ô)  Ò  Ô 
Total  Ò  Ô  Ò  Ò  Ò  Ò  Ò  Ô  Ò    Ô  Ò  Ò  (Ò)  Ò 
  
OAC  Old Age Cash benefits 
HSB  Sickness Benefits and Health  
FB  Family (cash, services and survivors’) Benefits 
SI  Social Inclusion (services and transfers on unemployment, housing, low 
income, disabled)  
Total  All public social expenditure according to OECD 
 
Finally, we can ask whether reforms of social inclusion policies 
have led to restructuring as regards the share of services relative to 
transfers. Chart 4 has been generated by calculating the share of Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    210 
spending on active labour market programmes and on services for 
the disabled and the elderly as a percentage of total spending on 
social inclusion (as defined for chart 3 and table 2). The focus on 
social inclusion favours policies that provide services like child 
care, training or drug counselling which, given the tight fiscal 
constraints of EU governments, is likely to come at the cost of 
transfers. 
 
Chart 4:   Share of services in spending on social inclusion,  
1986  and 1998 
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The service intensity of social inclusion policies has indeed 
risen in most countries. While the LH maintains that this is due to 
administrations’ attempt at creating jobs, the PER does at least not 
dismiss the possibility of this being a sensible restructuring to make 
social assistance more effective. The data does not exclude either 211   European Political Economy Review 
interpretation. This question will be briefly taken up below where I 
give a reason why the OMC favours ‘activation’ which is more 
service intensive (Begg et al 2001: 20-22). 
This review of the empirical evidence was meant to show that it 
is very difficult to explain the stylized facts of governments’ reform 
activism without taking recourse to political demand factors, such 
as structural change and thus shifting needs as regards social 
security. Even recent EU involvement can be seen as responding to 
popular demand. But the observable quantitative evidence also 
indicated that both volume and structure of social expenditure, in 
particular on inclusion policies, are quite resilient to change. While 
these results are not favourable to the LH, they also leave the PER 
with the question why reform efforts became coordinated in the 
social inclusion domain but less so in others. 
4.   How to explain integration in social assistance 
This section outlines why integration of social assistance policies 
may be warranted and why the OMC on social inclusion, rather than 
the Community Method, has helped to bring this about. Both lines 
of argument are to counter the LH view that EU involvement in 
social policy is excessive so that electoral demand for it lacks a 
rationale and can only be explained by bureaucracies’ inherent 
expansionism. Beforehand, conventional reasons for integration, i.e. 
spillovers of national policies due to mobility and returns to scale in 
public goods production, are negligeable in the case of the EU; 
while national social policy preferences are so heterogeneous that 
social policy matters should be left to member states (Alesina, 
Angeloni and Schuknecht 2001: 20). In contrast, I see three 
rationales for EU involvement, especially in a context of reform: 
•  Spillovers of national measures do not necessarily result from 
actual mobility. The notion of ‘welfare magnetism’ also 
comprises the phenomenon of perceived or virtual mobility. A 
public perception of migrants ‘flooding’ the country is typically 
created by media reports about singular cases that are hardly 
indicative of an actual increase in migration (Peterson and Rom 
1990: 72-81).  Since such cases become more frequently 
reported in the EU - as the public row between the UK and the Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    212 
French government over the Sangatte detention centre indicates 
-, the spillovers from virtual migration are endogenous to 
integration. This justifies a role of the EU in social policy 
matters if only to show a concern about these anxieties. 
•  Some coordination of policies relevant to social assistance is 
required to make EU citizens’ right to free movement effective. 
Mobility of persons in the EU is conditional on employment, i.e. 
unemployed transfer recipients of working age lose their 
entitlement if they leave the jurisdicion from which they receive 
benefits even if they cannot find a job there. Thus, it is plausible 
to argue that the EU’s guarantee of free movement requires 
complementary action in the social policy field to make the 
formal guarantee a reality, e.g. by promoting reforms that allow 
recipients to take up some hours of work without benefits being 
withdrawn at prohibitively high marginal rates. 
•  The idea of ‘laboratory federalism’ (Oates 1999: 1131-1134) 
proposes a catalytic role to the EU as regards domestic reform 
processes. Governments that share responsibilities and face joint 
constraints in a decentralised setting of policymaking have 
reason to engage in an exchange of learning experiences. 
Learning experiences can be interpreted as public goods for the 
dissemination of which individual agents, i.e. sovereign 
governments, have too little incentives. It is thus the role of the 
supranational level to provide the public good and provide for 
opportunities to meet regularly. Given the idiosyncracies of 
different welfare regimes, we should not expect outright policy 
transfer, however (Schelkle 2000).  
So there are normative reasons for the EU to play a role in 
social policy matters and this is important to note if we ask for the 
viability and legitimacy of an evolving Social Europe. But these 
reasons were valid even before the late 1990s and are valid for other 
domains than social inclusion as well. Thus one has to take recourse 
to political economy reasoning and look at specifics of EU 
involvement to solve the puzzle outlined earlier. 
Why communiterise at all? A number of studies have shown 
that phenomena, called ‘new poverty’ (Room 1990) and ‘social 
exclusion’, became an issue of public debate by the early 1980s 
(Bertola, Boeri and Nicoletti 2001; Mayes, Berghman and Salais 213   European Political Economy Review 
2001). Governments needed to be seen as doing something about it. 
At the same time, their fiscal room for manoeuvre became more 
constrained since mass unemployment had risen and growth rates 
plummeted. The term ‘social exclusion’ allowed to portray very 
different phenomena as belonging to a similar syndrome, be it 
‘globalisation’ or the ‘New Economy’, in any case not simply the 
result of domestic mismanagement. The coordinated combat of 
social exclusion signals activity with respect to a common problem, 
likely to be intensified by economic and monetary union. Although 
social assistance does not take up a large share of public social 
expenditures
8, this comes at the cost of governments having to 
compromise on national sovereignty. 
Why is the OMC on inclusion in member states’ interest? The 
question begs to explain why the OMC made positive integration of 
certain social policies easier. First of all, the OMC is a mode of 
governance that does not impair ultimate decisionmaking of 
governments, it is of an intergovernmentalist nature. But by sharing 
responsibilities, coordination allows to shift blame for certain 
measures to the EU level (Rhodes 2000: 4; Mosher 2000: 7). E.g. 
reducing the generosity of the system for longterm unemployed 
persons may look less harsh if the government can point to 
benchmarks or peer reviews that show its system to exhibit 
comparatively strong disincentives for work. Moreover, the OMC is 
an orderly way for governments to signal to the public that its 
reforms enter unknown territory but that one is in good company of 
like-minded administrations. In other words, the OMC allows 
governments to play a two-level game (Putnam 1988) in which the 
EU level can not only be made the scapegoat for unpopular reforms 
but also an instrument to deal with uncertainty in reform processes 
(Schelkle 2004). However, this comes at the cost of more 
technocratic policymaking where ‘shared’ may be synonymous with 
‘blurred’ responsibility.  
Why is the OMC on inclusion in the Commission’s interest? 
The blame shifting rationale for the OMC from member states’ 
                                                 
8   Around 1990, the budget share was between 0.6% of total social protection in 
Greece and 21.6% in Ireland, with France (6.8%), Germany (7.6), Italy (5.6) 
and the UK (13.4) in the middle (Eardley et al 1996: Table 2.2). But spending 
on social inclusion in the broader sense (cf. graph 3) is obviously as important 
as that on health and old age insurance. Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    214 
point of view raises the question why the Commission is prepared 
to play that role. After all, playing the scapegoat may destroy her 
already precarious legitimacy. Against that background, the 
‘intergovernmental nature’ of the OMC may actually be a safeguard 
for the Commission. This mode of governance has shifted 
competencies and initiative back to member states while the 
Commission is basically confined to put external pressure on 
national administrations to act according to a time schedule. As the 
first joint report amply documents (Commission 2001: 22-23 and 
passim), the Commission acts as the messenger rather than as the 
initiator of blame and shame, in contrast for instance to competition 
policy. This makes perfect sense in a policy area where the EU has 
neither the legal instruments nor the budget to be more forthcoming. 
The drawback of this protected role is, of course, that the OMC is a 
very soft method the effectiveness of which ultimately depends on 
dedicated national policymakers. 
Why the emphasis on labour market inclusion? From a PER 
perspective, it is not surprising that the OMC on inclusion has a 
strong tendency, critics say ‘bias’, to emphasize reforms that 
provide services to facilitate the reintegration of the socially 
excluded into the labour market. Again and somewhat 
paradoxically, demand factors of welfare state reform are likely 
candidates to seek an explanation. The basic social safety nets for 
the longterm unemployed and other socially excluded are not of 
primary concern to the majority because the incidence of social 
exclusion is concentrated among certain high risk groups (Hills 
2002: 229-231) and their payment is not based on earlier 
contributions. Thus, means-tested welfare has to be legitimised. 
Workfare legitimises social assistance in that it conditions eligibility 
not only on low income but also on a work test or training 
requirement. This is particularly important in Social Europe where a 
sense of solidarity among EU citizens has yet to develop. 
This latter argument may explain, in particular, why we do not 
find as much fervor to softly coordinate social policies in the area of 
pensions or health. Reform pressures in both areas are, if anything, 
even more urgent for the fiscal viability of European welfare states. 
EU involvement is less popular in these areas, however (cf. table 1). 215   European Political Economy Review 
5.   Concluding remarks 
This paper answers the question why we find positive integration in 
social assistance policies. Beforehand, this is unlikely, given that 
social policies of more immediate common concern to EMU have 
not become coordinated and given that there are good theoretical 
reasons for an asymmetry in integration working against positive 
integration. To highlight the specifics of my prefered PER 
explanation, it was contrasted with the public choice view of the 
welfare state and its reform.  
More specifically, the PER hypothesis suggests that the 
theoretically puzzling integration of social inclusion policies can be 
explained as serving attempts at domestic reforms. Its emphasis of 
demand factors makes the confinement to social assistance plausible 
because that seems to be acceptable to, if not outright popular with, 
electorates in member states. In line with the explanation of these 
two features, the PER provides a rationale why it was not the 
Community Method but the intergovernmentalist OMC that has 
brought about this unlikely spectacle of positive integration.   
How does the argument put forward in this paper contribute to 
the literature on the political economy of welfare state reform?  The 
PER has traditionally debated with defendants of the ‘European 
social model’ who claim that globalisation threatens to lead to ‘a 
rush to the bottom’ of welfare standards and conclude that more 
open economies require bigger welfare states. The PER proponents 
counter these statements by showing that it is domestic and not 
external pressures which drove welfare state evolutions in the last 
two decades (Iversen 2001). I have used their evidence against the 
LH which is critical of today’s European welfare states. The LH 
would have a dismal assessment of the PER finding that welfare 
states are resilient to (attempts at) fundamental reform. Since the 
underlying theory excludes electoral demand influence on post-
election politics by assumption, it must be the self-interest of 
administrations and policymakers giving in to special interests who 
are responsible for this resilience. European integration is then 
another means to achieve national policymakers’ and 
administrations’ illegitimate goals. 
If this evidence can be used to refute the LH of the welfare state 
and of Social Europe, it does not only contribute to the theory of 
welfare state reform. It also expands the explanatory power of the Schelkle: Political economy of Social Europe    216 
PER to the realm of integration theory: why do governments seek 
supranational coordination to respond to what are ultimately 
domestic reform pressures? I suggested that the specifics of the 
integration method matter, in this case the OMC. This should alert 
the PER to the fact that its critical view of external pressure 
hypotheses must not make it overlook their strategic relevance, i.e. 
that reform strategies often deliberately create external pressures by 
way of entering international commitments. These commitments 
promise to work precisely because the external pressure argument 
resonates in public debates. But the different hypotheses of external 
pressure, the LH among them, mistake the means for the substance.  
The OMC on social inclusion may have achieved positive 
integration because it is implicitly based on the insight that 
domestic reform pressures can be reconstructed as externally 
imposed.  
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